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ARTHUR H. CHAN, Pll.D.*

To Market or Not to Market:
Allocation of Interstate Waters
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas set forth a market-orientedpolicy, based on the commerce clause,
to govern the allocation of interstate groundwater.The advantages
of this approach include the promotion of economic efficiency and
the protection of thefederal union. Unrestrainedmarket competition,
however, makes it possible for a bigger and more economically
powerful state to overwhelm its less prosperous competitors and
unilaterallyappropriatean inequitableshare of the resources. That
would seriously undermine the freedom and power of the economically weaker states regardingpreservation of unique lifestyle and
fulfillment of aspirations. Such antagonistic relationshipsamong equal
quasi-sovereignstates is not conducive to maintaininginterstatecomity within thefederal union. To unify the body of laws governing the
allocation of all interstate water resources, it is suggested that a
regulatory approach based on equitable apportionment be used instead of market allocation. Properly applied, this alternative approach can protect the federal union as well as promote equity,
freedom, and community cohesion.
INTRODUCTION

The significance of the Supreme Court decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas' relative to interstate groundwater allocation stems from
the extension by the Court of the commerce clause principles to groundwater transfer.' The Court declared in Sporhase that groundwater is an
article of interstate commerce. As a result, the market will play a more
prominent role in groundwater transfer and allocation. 3
*Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM
88003
I. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
2. Water Law Study Committee, The Impact of Recent Court Decisions Concerning Water and
Interstate Commerce on Water Resources of the State of New Mexico, 24 NAT. REs. J. 689, 690

(1984).
3. it should be pointed out that the Sporhase decision represents a departure from the doctrine
of equitable apportionment which governs the allocation of interstate surface flows. See Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). By applying different doctrines to surface water and groundwater,
the Supreme Court seems to be distinguishing them as separate entities. Scientific study, however,
has shown that they belong to the same hydrologic system.
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Broadening the scope of the market seems to be consistent with the
prevailing sociopolitical mood of a sizable segment of the American
society. Witness the rash of deregulations since the mid-1970s in the
banking, transportation, and telecommunication industries. Moreover,
according to economic theory, allocating resources in accordance with
the dictates of market forces promotes economic efficiency. 4 Additionally,
allowing the free flow of goods across state lines in interstate commerce
is viewed as a safeguard against divisive fragmentation of the national
economy.'
The market approach to groundwater allocation thus seems capable of
providing certain attractive advantages, including the promotion of economic efficiency and the protection of national unity. However, the policy
of relying on the market to allocate interstate groundwater has some very
serious defects-chiefly, adverse impacts on equity, freedom, and community cohesion between states. It is in light of these and other policy
considerations that this article will argue against the market approach
based on the commerce clause. In its place, a regulatory approach 6 grounded
on the doctrine of equitable apportionment will be recommended. The
case in which El Paso, Texas contemplates the appropriation and exportation of groundwater from southern New Mexico serves to illustrate the
various issues.
MERITS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Constitution specifies that "Congress shall have Power. . . [t]o
regulate Commerce . . .among the several States." 7 The Supreme Court
has taken this constitutional stipulation to infer "limitations on the power
of states to regulate commerce. . . .This negative aspect of the commerce
clause has come to be known as the 'dormant commerce clause.'"" The
dormant commerce clause is used to protect "the national union from
being economically fragmented and thus weakened by individual states
imposing burdensome measures, such as taxes or tariffs or bans on goods,
which would impede commerce."'
4. See, e.g., T. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 126-28 (1988).
5. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of Current Issues, 22 NAT.
REs. J. 1045, 1058 (1982); Gross, Commerce Clause Curbs State Control ofInterstate Use ofGround
Water: City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 24 NAT. RES. J. 213, 216 (1984).
6. See Chan, The Nature of Water Resources Policy and Policymaking. 41 AM. J. ECON. & Soc.
85, 86-87, 88 (1982). This characterization originates from Theodore Lowi's work. See infra note
103.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
8. Barnett, Mixing Water and the Commerce Clause: The Problems of Practice, Precedent, and
Policy in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 24 NAT. RES. J.161, n. 2 (1984).
9. Utton, In Search of An Integrating Principle for Interstate Water Law: Regulation versus the
Market Place, 25 NAT. REs. J. 985, 987 (1985).
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One should be cautioned not to conclude that the commerce clause
represents a blanket denial to state regulation of interstate trade, however,
for states may practice permissible regulation in order to protect some

legitimate local interests. In reviewing any such regulation, the Supreme
Court focuses on the nature of the regulation to determine if it poses an
undue burden on interstate commerce. " The goal is to eliminate barriers
to free trade which states may be tempted to erect so as to protect their
own individual special interests, but to the detriment of the national
welfare. "If states considered themselves separable economic units, then
the consequences of retaliatory economic protection could cripple our
economy: Michigan might control auto exports; New York, milk; and

Ohio, rubber tires.""
The policy of promoting free trade under the mandate of the commerce
clause is well supported by the efficiency argument of neoclassical microeconomic theory. 2 Indeed, market allocation of water had been advocated
long before Sporhase. 3 The argument usually runs as follow: "The basic
proposition is that market forces should be permitted to play an expanded
role in the allocation of water rights thus encouraging or at least permitting
efficiency in water use.:''"4 To better discern how free trade can help
promote efficiency, it may be instructive to relate economic efficiency to
consumer and producer surpluses or net benefits. 5 As neoclassical theory
suggests, once a price is set in the competitive market by the market
forces of supply and demand, consumers and producers will take the price
10. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970).
1i.Gross, supra note 5. See also H.P. Hood & Sons v.Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).

12. Neoclassical microcconomic theory is principally a theory of exchange which examines the
behavior of consumers and producers in a market economy. In such an economy, price plays the
crucial rationing role both inallocating resources to different uses and in distributing products among
potential buyers. Microeconomic theory, therefore, is also known as price theory. For an explication
of the role of prices in the market eoconomy, see J. QUIRK, INTERMEDIATE MICRoECoNoMICS 16-18
(1987).
The theory demonstrates that at market equilibrium, the competitive economy will attain "an
allocation of resources that is so efficient that it is impossible to make one person better off without
hurting [some] other person by any reallocation of resources." R. RUFFIN, MODERN PRICE THEORY
149 (1988). But see Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 ETHics 301, 305 (1986); infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
13. Market allocation of water actually refers to "the distribution of rights which would result
from the operation of a system of free market transfers." Oeltjen & Fischer, Allocation ofRights to
Water: Preferences, Priorities, and the Role of the Market, 57 NEB. L. REV. 245, 247 (1978).

14. Id. at 245.
15. Consumer surplus is the difference between the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay
for a specific unit of a product and its market price (the price the consumer must pay in order to
acquire the product). Producer surplus is the difference between the minimum price a producer wants
to receive before making available to the market an additional unit of output and the market price
(the price the producer will receive for the sale of the product). Alternatively, consumer surplus is
considered the net benefit accrued to the consumer, while producer surplus is similarly considered
the net benefit accrued to the producer. See, e.g., T. TIETENBERG, supra note 4, at 41.
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as given," and will respectively consume and produce in quantities which
will maximize their individual net benefits. 7 Many economists have then
concluded that "the price system. . . induces those self-interested parties
to make choices which are efficient from the point of view of society as
a whole""8 as total (consumer and producer) net benefits are maximized.
Such are the socioeconomic benefits of the commerce clause. Properly
enforced, it is able "to encourage a national market for all resources or
goods and to encourage maximum efficiency in the use of those resources. "" The Supreme Court's belief that a market approach to resource
allocation would ultimately strengthen the national union demonstrates
the importance of the economy in society. It also underscores the need
for society to select an appropriate institutional form to organize its economy so that the instrumental criterion of providing for "the continuity of
human life and the noninvidious re-creation of community" ' can be
fulfilled. Unfortunately, the analysis that follows in this article will show
that an interstate groundwater allocation policy under the commerce clause
will not meet the two requirements contained in this criterion, and the
market thus may not be the appropriate institution to allocate interstate
waters.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF A MARKET ECONOMY IN SOCIETY
Recognizing that the economy is an integral part of a system of social
relationships among humanity, ecology, and technology called society,
Karl Polanyi has argued that the economy can be better understood if it
is viewed substantively as "an instituted process of interaction between
man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want
satisfying material means"23 to assure human survival. In order to play
its role as an indispensable but subordinate part of the overall social
system, the substantive economic process must be "instituted." 22 To institute the human economy is to embed it in social institutions.23
"The instituting of the economic process vests that process with unity
and stability; it produces a structure with a definite function in society;
.. . it centers interest on values, motives and policy."'24 Unity and staSee, e.g., J. QUIRK, supra note 12, at 24.
T. TiETENBERG, supra note 4, at 41.
Id.at 42.
Green, Water Law-Sporhase v. Nebraska, 23 NAT. REs. J. 923, 926 (1983).
20. M. TOOL, THE DISCRETIONARY ECONOMY 293 (1979).
21. Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process, in TRADE AND MARKET IN THE EARLY
248 (K. Polanyi, C. Arensberg & H. Pearson eds. 1971).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 250.
24. Id. at 249-50.
16.
17.
18.
19.

EMPIRES
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bility, defined respectively as the interdependence and recurrence of its
parts," are acquired through a combination of integrative forms. Three
such forms have been identified-reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange--each requiring the preexistence of a unique structure of institutional support to become integratively effective.26
Exchange is the relevant form in a resource allocation policy under the
commerce clause. To be integrative, exchange relies on price-making
markets for institutional support.' 7 Exchange generally can be conducted
either at set or at bargained rate,28 with the latter being pertinent to the
present situation. Exchange at bargained rate is therefore integrated by
the competitive market mechanism.29 Further, "even price-making markets are integrative only if they are linked up in a system which tends to
spread the effect of prices to markets other than those directly affected. ,o
The preceding describes what is known as a market economy. It is "an
economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone;
order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this selfregulating mechanism. An economy of this kind derives from the expectation that human beings behave in such a way as to achieve maximum
money gains. . . . [Oirder in the production and distribution of goods is
ensured by prices alone."'" Moreover, "[n]othing must be allowed to
inhibit the formation of markets. . . .Neither must there be any interference with the adjustment of prices to changed market conditions ...
Hence there must not only be markets for all elements of industry, but
no measure or policy must be countenanced that would influence the
action of these markets." 32 This, no doubt, succinctly but accurately
articulates the thinking and vision of the Supreme Court when it ruled in
favor of the commerce clause, declared that groundwater is an article of
commerce, and struck down part of a Nebraska law which it considered
to present an unreasonable burden to free interstate trade.33
The presentation above of the nature and scope of a market economy
in society is intended not only to clarify the way and conditions under
which a market economy is developed, but also to provide the background
needed to carry out a more fundamental and meaningful analysis of the
25. Id. at 250. Unity is achieved when interdependent parts (e.g., states) coalesce to form a
unified whole (e.g., the federal union); stability is achieved when the parts are able to regenerate
or perpetuate themselves. Id.
26. Id. at 250-51.
27. Id. at 254.
28. Id. at 254-55.
29. Id. at 255.
30. Id.
31. K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 68 (1957).
32. Id.at 69 (footnote omitted).
33.. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S, 941 (1982).
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interstate groundwater allocation policy initiated by Sporhase. This is
important and necessary because while the benefits are quite well-known,
a number of undesirable consequences exist which, though less apparent,
are nonetheless very grave. These adverse results, therefore, need to be
scrutinized more closely.
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE
GROUNDWATER COMPETITION
To clearly identify the adverse consequences of interstate competition
over groundwater, it is necessary to first recognize the fact that in unfettered market competition, big fish will eat small fish. Long-run analysis
in neoclassical microeconomic theory shows that economies of scale will
help a firm lower its average cost as it expands output.' This implies,
of course, that as a firm gets bigger, it becomes more efficient and therefore a more formidable competitor to its smaller rivals.35 Economists
generally welcome the growth and expansion of a firm on efficiency
grounds within the range of output where economies of scale exist.
The predatory tendency inherent in market competition is undoubtedly
advantageous to the large producer, which gains from lower average cost,
and it may even be beneficial to consumers if part of the cost saving is
passed onto them. Nevertheless, it places the smaller firms, which have
higher costs, in a very difficult position for long term survival. Put this
scenario in the context of interstate groundwater competition, and the
subtle detrimental impacts quickly become apparent. When a state with
greater wealth is pitted against another with less financial resources in
an all-out, unrestrained competition, the final outcome is virtually predictable. a6 The proposed groundwater exportation from southern New
Mexico to El Paso, Texas offers an illustrative case study of potential
policy impacts emanating from Sporhase.
Until 1983, New Mexico had a law prohibiting groundwater from being
transported outside the state.37 In the late 1970s, the City of El Paso
explored the feasibility of acquiring additional water supplies from distant
sources to meet its future demand. Among the alternatives considered,
appropriating and transporting groundwater from aquifers in southern
New Mexico appeared to be the least costly. To overcome the obstacle
34. See, e.g., J. QUIRK, supra note 12, at 184-85.
35. This phenomenon of lowering cost persists until the firm becomes too large and diseconomies
of scale set in, thereby raising its average cost. Id. at 185-86.
36. The "product" in the context of states is economic development. Economic development, in
turn, has implications upon a state's ability to attract industry, protect its tax base, and continue its
past growth pattern into the future. In short, the very health and survival of a state could be at stake.
37. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12-19 (repealed 1983, replaced by N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12B-I to
-12B-2 (Supp. 1984)).
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presented by the New Mexico export ban, El Paso in 1980 filed suit in
federal court challenging the constitutionality of the groundwater embargo." Subsequent to the Sporhase decision in 1982, and similarly using
the commerce clause as the legal basis, the federal district court of New
Mexico in 1983 39ruled in favor of El Paso and struck down the export
embargo statute.
The significance of the case,. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, lies in the
reasoning behind the legal opinion. As pointed out earlier, states are
allowed to regulate interstate commerce, provided such regulation serves
some legitimate local purpose.' Thus, "[cliting Sporhase, the court in
El Paso distinguished the legitimate local purpose of health and safety
regulation from economic protectionism. Narrowly interpreting Sporhase,
the court defined public health needs as survival needs and said that only
survival needs are a legitimate local purpose that justifies discriminatory
regulation. ""'
This narrow definition of legitimate local purpose in effect established
different standards for in-state and out-of-state water uses. Whereas legitimate in-state uses for regulatory purposes are limited to health and
survival needs, water exported out of state may be free from any regulation
and could rightfully be-put to use for economic purposes.42 Even though
this position may be based on sound economic theory, it still raises a
fundamental issue concerning the equitable or evenhanded treatment between in-state and out-of-state water uses.43 To the district court, El Paso's
municipal and industrial needs are pressing---a claim that was not reviewed by the court and is still in dispute. New Mexico's needs, on the
other hand, are mostly agricultural,
with municipal and other needs rising
5
in some distant future.
Basic economic analysis reveals that: (1) the monetary value created
by a unit of water being put to municipal or industrial use is greater than
38. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F.Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
39. Id. at 390-92.
40. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
41. Gross, supra note 5, at 217.
42. The State Engineer, the chief water resources administrator in New Mexico, does not have
clear authority to oversee or manage the use of water once it leaves the state. Meanwhile, water
imported from another state may not come under the jurisdiction of Texas authority, either. Imported
water thus falls through a crack in the existing administrative-regulatory system and may not be
subject to any regulation whatsoever. See Corker, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: Does the
Dormant Commerce Clause Really Limit the Power of a State to Forbid (I) the Export of Water and
(2) the Creation of a Water Right for Use in Another State? 54 U. CoLo. L. REV. 393, 394, n.5
(1983). But see City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. at 390.
43. For discussion of facts being incongruent with the theory and its assumptions, see infra notes
56-58 and accompanying text.
44. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 391 (D.N.M. 1983).
45. Id. at 389-90.
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that being put to agricultural use as evidenced by the higher price of
water municipal and industrial users are willing and able to pay;46 and
(2) present benefits are always weighed more heavily than future benefits
because future benefits must be discounted to arrive at their present values.47
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the court concluded that El
Paso's current municipal and industrial needs should be favored over New
Mexico's current agricultural and future municipal/industrial needs. Since
it makes perfect sense in terms of efficiency, "the court agreed to El
Paso's right to use New Mexico water now for the same purposes as
New Mexico proposed using it in the future simply because this would
promote current economic prosperity. " However, such reasoning in
effect ignores the fact that:
[slometimes the economic activities a state might want to protect
will be related intimately to a pattern of living or to a lifestyle....
As a consequence, contrary to El Paso, arguably threats to economic
activities which are integrally related to patterns of living should
constitute "severe shortages" under Sporhase, and a state's interests
in protecting those activities should be regarded as "legitimate conservation and preservation interests" sufficient to justify discriminatory export restrictions. 49
Arthur Okun perceptively commented on the proper scope of market
transaction.' Despite the many useful functions which the market is well
suited to perform, Okun counseled against using a monetary yardstick to
measure the value of everything in society. He warned: "The imperialism
of the market's valuation accounts for its contribution, and for its threat
to other institutions. . . . Given the chance, it would sweep away all
other values, and establish a vending-machine society [in which one can
buy anything one wants by inserting the proper number of coins]. The
rights and powers that money should not buy must be protected with
sanctions, and with countervailing aids to those
detailed regulations and
5
with low incomes." '
With regard to New Mexico's claim to its water, the rights and powers
Okun spoke of refer to equitable treatment, participatory freedom, and
rational planning for its future. New Mexico is economically poorer and
less populous than its neighboring states. 52 The ruling of El Paso allows
46.
47.
48.
49.

R. RUFFIN, supra note 12, at 369.
J. HARTWICK & N. OLEWILER, THE
Gross, supra note 5. at 218.
Barnett, supra note 8, at 170.

ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE USE

3-7 (1986).

50. A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).

51. Id. at 13, 119.
52. U.S. BUREAU OF

16 (1987); U.S.

THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LOCAL POPULATION ESTIMATES

3, 4, 14,

BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LOCAL AREA PERSONAL
INCOME 1979-84, VOL. 7, SOTHWEST REGION I (1986); Water Law Study Committee, supra note

1, at 712.
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any state (not just neighboring ones) to appropriate and export groundwater from New Mexico so long as the exporter can afford it. 3 Notwithstanding efficiency considerations, is it fair to sacrifice a poor region
by depriving it of the benefits derived from future use of the water for
the sake of furthering current economic prosperity of other more affluent
regions? Should the formulation of a national policy of interstate groundwater allocation be driven largely by the relative level of state economic
development?
More fundamentally, reality simply does not fit some of the assumptions
of the model of a competitive market, upon which the entire argument
of efficient allocation of resources is built.' In particular, one requirement
for a competitive market is the presence of a sufficiently large number
of participants. The purpose of this requirement is to disperse economic
power evenly among small operators, so that no single operating entity
is in a position to exploit its superior power to undermine competition
and to gain unjustified advantage. 55 This condition of dispersed power
clearly does not exist among consumers in a water market. Analytically,
consumptive water users can be instructively grouped into two classes:
domestic-commercial-industrial and agricultural. Due to the lesser quantity of water used and/or higher value of output produced with the help
of water, the former class of consumers are much more able to pay a
higher price for an additional unit of water. Thus, unequal economic
power exists between these two groups of water users.
This anomalous condition--from the standpoint of the competitive
model-is further complicated in this case study by the unequal economic
power existing between New Mexico and Texas. 56 Such disparity of economic power possessed by different competitors not only violates the
assumption of the competitive model presently under examination, thereby
making efficient resource allocation highly unlikely, but it also makes
equitable treatment of market participants, virtually impossible. 7 Even in
53, The costs to El Paso in its effort will (excluding administrative and litigation costs) involve

extraction and transportation expenses; the water itself is free since it is presently unappropriated.
Out-of-state appropriators wishing to obtain groundwater from areas where all such water has been
previously appropriated will incur the added expense of purchasing water rights. This fact was used
by Professor Trelease to distinguish between the nature of controversies in Sporhase ("state regulation
of private trading in water and water rights") and El Paso ("state allocation of its public domain").
Trelease, Interstate Use of Water-Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike & Vermejo, 22 LAND AND WATER L.
REv. 315, 319 (1987).
54. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
55. Large numbers of participants and the resulting dispersal of economic power are the reasons
why consumers and producers in competitive markets are price-takers rather than price-setters. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. For the related issue of double standard in treatment of in-state vis-a-vis out-of-state users,
see supra note 42 and accompanying text. Discussion of the imperative to consider different states'
rights equally can be found infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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the best of times "there is no particular reason to expect that a voluntary
system of bargaining among people (such as occurs under perfect competition) will necessarily result in an equitable allocation of the available
resources. Initial endowments may be too skewed . . . to permit such a
result. There is no 'invisible hand' guiding a competitive system toward
equitable solutions. If we insist on equity, it may be necessary to opt for
some governmental coercion .. .to get people to agree to allocations
they would not voluntarily accept." '
This view supports Okun's scheme of having government play a role
in controlling and regulating economic activities.5 9 The scope of that role
conceivably could be quite broad. Such conception of governmental functions may be contrary to the individualistic Lockean notion of limited
state,' whose rallying cry has been "get the government off our back."
Yet freedom is not merely the absence of coercion. "It is, rather, the
exercise of informed, discretionary judgment over the qualitative character of restraints which is founded upon warranted knowledge of the
synergistic consequences of our actions in a complex environment." 6 So
conceived, freedom is the power to "exercise discretion over the character
of restraints. Power ... thus becomes ...a necessary condition for
freedom to be effective." 62
If New Mexico is to be a free state among equals, it must have the
power to choose among meaningful options and viable alternatives. The
"tyranny of the dollar yardstick"6 3 subjugates that freedom to the financial
wealth of others. "Efficient as the market mechanism may be as an
allocator, it cannot solve problems of distribution of resources or income. . . .These problems have to do with the evolving definition of
community needs and preferences. "' Each state has its unique character
which it wishes to preserve and its own destiny which it strives to fulfill.
The impersonal market machine which grinds out identical units and sells
them in a manner akin to vending machines is therefore antithetical to
the ideals of freedom and power.
Another consideration central to evaluating the reliance on market for
allocation of groundwater has to do with community cohesion, such as
the impact of a market-based allocation policy on the relationship between
states. Is such a policy conducive to maintaining a cohesive federal union?
58, W. NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITSAPPLICATION 530 (1987).
59. A. OKUN, supra note 50, at 101-17.
60. G. LODGE, THE NEw AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 100-03 (1976).

61. Hickerson, Complexity and the Meaning of Freedom: The Instrumentalist View. 43 AM. J.
ECON. & Soc. 435, 436-37 (1984).

62. Id. at 437.
63. A. OKUN, supra note 50, at 119.
64. G.LODGE, supra note 60, at 253.
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This question can be more properly addressed in the broader context of
a market economy explicated above.6' Polanyi has keenly observed that
the establishment of a market economy also creates a different kind of
society. Whereas "normally, the economic order is merely a function of
the social, in which it is contained," Polanyi notes that:
[A] self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional
separation of society into an economic and political sphere....
[Furthermore, sluch an institutional pattern could not function unless
society was somehow subordinated to its requirements. A market
must comprise
economy can exist only in a market society [because it]
all elements of industry, including labor, land, and money .... But
labor and land are no other than the human beings themselves of
which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which
it exists. To include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market.'
Development of a market society requires that the economic system
be brought "under the sole control of the incentives of hunger and gainor, more precisely, fear of going without the necessities of life, and
expectation of profit." '67 Bargaining is an essential feature of exchange
in a market economy. Parties engaged in this peculiar form of bargaining
are motivated by gain from the exchange. However, any gain by one
party is obtainable only at the expense of the other. An antagonistic
relationship therefore arises between the trading parties, and the nature
of that relationship cannot be modified so long as exchange continues to
be conducted at bargained rate and the parties are driven by greed."s This
latent problem has prompted societies in the past to curtail the scope of
the market. Life-dependent items, for example, have traditionally been
excluded from the realm of exchange to avoid arousing intense anxiety
over the possibility of "going without the necessities of life."'
Nowhere can the foregoing arguments find greater applicability than
in water resources. "[W]ater is not only essential for biological survival,
but a necessary prerequisite for the development and maintenance of the
economy and social structure which make a society possible. Water is
65. See supra notes 29, 30 and accompanying text.
66. K. POLANYI, supra note 31, at 71 (emphasis added).
67. Polanyi, Our Obsolete Market Mentality, 3 COMMENTARY 109, 111 (1947). Another requirement, as just pointed out, is to create the notion that labor, land, and money are actually commodities--objects produced for sale-and make them available, along with other "elements of
industry," for trading on the market. K. POLANYI, supra note 31, at 72.
68. Polanyi, supra note 21, at 255.The opportunity for both parties to gain simultaneously from
trade as i result of comparative advantage is acknowledged. The issue here, however, is not about
the total benefit that could be generated; rather, it is about how that benefit is divided between the
parties.
69. Polanyi, supra note 67.
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not just a commodity; it is a central imperative for the survival, maintenance, and continuity of living communities, including states of a federal union. "70 The policy initiated by Sporhase established the commerce
clause as the governing principle in interstate groundwater allocation.
Expanding the scope of market trade into new areas certainly helps foster
the establishment of a market society. As made clear previously, however,
there is a price to pay. Already, concern over hunger and gain in market
exchange together with the associated antagonistic relationship between
trading parties are becoming evident in the ongoing dispute over interstate
groundwater transfer between New Mexico and El Paso, Texas. 7 The
antagonism has manifested in El Paso being perceived as preying on New
Mexico for its own gain. Texas will be able to prosper because a neighboring state is being sacrificed.7" Southern New Mexico will be facing a
stagnant economic future as a result.
So there may not be greater cohesion within the federal union. Instead,
there are in New Mexico deep suspicion and strong negative feeling
toward El Paso. The anxiety over the possible loss of control of groundwater to out-of-state appropriators and the consequent decline of the
community has prompted some to suggest that New Mexico should stop
being defensive, that it should go on the offense and investigate the
feasibility of importing water from all other states." The idea, if implemented, would put the theory of Sporhase into practice and would threaten
the actual establishment of a nationwide water market. The suggestion
is perhaps unrealistic, but the sentiment reflects the depth of frustration
resulting from the usurpation of state control by the market, and it hints
at the risk of having the antagonism spread over to a wider geographical
area.
It is now possible to answer the crucial question: Is a market-based
interstate groundwater allocation policy, such as that embodied in Sporhase, instrumental? That is, is it contributing to "the continuity of human
life and the noninvidious re-creation of community?" '74 The answer is no.
Indeed, the policy, which has the potential of draining water from rural
southern New Mexico to urban El Paso, can be economically and socially
disruptive, "for without the required groundwater resources there could
be no agricultural economy [in the arid West]; without a healthy economy
there would be no future; without a future the community would find it
70. Utton, supra note 9, at 992.
71. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983), later proceeding,
597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
72. Utton, supra note 9, at 992.
73. Thomas G. Bahr, Prepared Statement for testimony before Interim Water Usage and Resources
Committee, New Mexico State Legislature, October 28, 1983, at 1-2 (mimeographed).
74. M. TOOL, supra note 20.
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difficult to sustain or renew itself; and without a sustainable community
human livelihood would be impossible to continue."'75
To be considered instrumental, policies need to provide for economic
stabilization so that vital economic institutions are maintained and the
community is re-created. "Economic stabilization becomes a matter of
sustaining the flow of income so that households, businesses, and government agencies are reproduced as going concerns." 76 Quasi-sovereign
states face additional constitutional obligations. Unlike a business enterprise which can declare bankruptcy and go out of business when it fails
in the marketplace, a state faces the constitutional requirement of preserving itself. The tenth amendment to the Constitution can be construed
to prohibit states from going out of business.' However, drained of the
lifeblood called water in a "demonstrably arid"" state like New Mexico,
it is difficult to see how the state can continue as a viable going concern.
The possibility of "ghost states" existing in the midst of the federal union
is therefore real if the social and economic integrity of the states comes
under relentless attack.
The basic fact is every society needs a functioning economy, but the
productive apparatus needs to be embedded in social institutions. That is
to say, the economy plays a vital role in society, but that role is only a
subordinate one.' Therefore, in the final analysis, leaving the human life
process, human economy, and cohesive community structures-the major
concerns of instrumental public policy-to the vagaries of the market
exposes society to unacceptably high risks. That proposition is untenable;
the policy issues have to be dealt with in some other way.
EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT, RECIPROCITY,
AND REGULATION
The stage for recommending equitable apportionment as the alternative
legal doctrine governing all interstate water resources disputes is well set
by the following eloquent statement:
It may be that inscrutable economic forces of the marketplace, under
the commerce clause, will lead to greater efficiency and production
of greater wealth. It may be that efficiency would dictate that individual states should become regional sacrifice areas to provide the
75. Chan, Policy Impacts ofSporhase v. Nebraska, 22 J. EcoN. IssuEs 1153, 1162 (1988).
76. Stanfield, Social Reform and Economic Policy, 18 J. EcoN. Issus 19, 23 (1984).
77. DuMars, Evaluating Congressional Limits on a State's Severance Tax Equity Interest in Its
Natural Resources: An Essential Responsibility for the Supreme Court, 22 NAT. Rs. J. 673, 680
(1982).
78. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
79. Polanyi, supra note 67, at 112.
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water to fuel the further economic development of the more economically advanced. It may be that individual states should be able
to unilaterally determine their share of the use of water resources
based on their stage of economic development. However, if there is
merit to the idea of the founding fathers that it is desirable to maintain
balance between member states, if there is merit to the idea that
diversity contributes to a strong economy, and if there is value in
the suggestion that viable constituent parts contribute to a stronger
federation, then perhaps it is appropriate to design a doctrine of
interstate water allocation which, while limiting the territorial sovereignty of individual states, recognizes the territorial integrity of
member states and equitably balances their competing needs in the
case of interstate water resources."
Initially, equitable apportionment should be relied upon to allocate
water resources between states to the extent that (1) surface water and
groundwater are two components of the same hydrologic system and (2)
there are interstate interests involved. Because the Supreme Court has
already consistently recognized equitable apportionment as the governing
principle in resolving interstate surface water disputes, 8 applying the
same doctrine to groundwater preserves judicial consistency while simultaneously conforming to real circumstances. It is therefore a logical
way to unify surface water and groundwater legally and scientifically.
Furthermore, "the principal [sic] of equitable apportionment first requires the Court to apportion interstate water so that each state may enjoy
benefits from the use of the water. Second, the principle of equitable
apportionment requires the Court to divide the benefits equitably according to some sense of fairness to both states."" 2 These two requirements
show the Court's desire to promote equity when it divides the water in
an interstate stream between the states sharing it. While acknowledging
the states' disparate needs, the Court treats all states as equal quasisovereigns. 3 The recognition of states as quasi-sovereigns confers to each
certain territorial and proprietary rights. Equality refers to the equal footing on which each state stands relative to all other states with respect to
its right to govern its territory and property.' Equality of right, however,
80. Utton, supra note 9, at 989.
81. The doctrine of equitable apportionment was set out for the first time in Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907). it was subsequently applied in a series of cases, including, e.g., Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Washington
v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589 (1945), modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953); and most recently in Colorado v. New Mexico,
459 U.S. 176 (1982), modified, 467 U.S, 310 (1984).
82. Comment, Is There a Future for Proposed Water Uses in Equitable Apportionment Suits?,
25 NAT. REs, J.791, 795 (1985).
83. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
84. Comment, supra note 82.
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does not imply equal division of water; it simply means that the Court
will consider the rights of all states as being on an equal level. 8 Colorado
v. New Mexico, 6 for example, was decided on the basis of equitable
apportionment. Although Colorado was not granted an equitable apportionment decree and thus received a zero share of the water under litigation, equity between the states remains a primary concern.87
Once a state is allocated a fair share of the water, it is then able to
plan, manage, and use its water resources in a manner which will serve
its interests and needs. With the power to control its resources, the state
is in a position to choose among alternative courses of action to shape
its future. Participating fully in decisionmaking with genuine choice among
meaningful options without undue threat or pressure from external sources
is the mark of true freedom." Surely states are better able to enjoy that
freedom and exercise their power when they possess the knowledge that
a specified quantity of water is forthcoming.8 9 Compared to the uncertainty
inherent in the market approach embodied in the commerce clause, there
is little question that equitable apportionment is far more preferable in
this regard.
Water is crucial to human livelihood in the arid West. For a variety of
reasons, including the collapse of the energy sector, the phenomenal
economic growth in Texas and New Mexico of the last decade has slowed
down dramatically. Consequently, growth stimulation now assumes added
urgency. Should it be deprived of an adequate supply of water, perhaps
as a result of interstate water market competition, it would be difficult
for southern New Mexico to continue generating "the flow of income so
that households, businesses, and government agencies are reproduced as
going concerns.'
Economic decline would, in turn, jeopardize "the
85. For reasons of equal consideration of "matters of fundamental importance," see Mooney,
Criteria for Justice, 45 AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 223, 224-25 (1986).
86. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
87. "[The just apportionment of interstate waters is a question of federal law that depends 'upon
a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending states and all other relevantfacts."' Id. at
184 (quoting Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660. 670-71 (1931)). Some of the relevant
facts reviewed by the Court in Colorado related to the potential benefits that might be accrued to
Colorado as well as the harm most certainly would be inflicted on New Mexico as a result of the
proposed diversion. The Court concluded that Colorado had not demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed diversion would indeed produce great benefits and only minimal harm.
Furthermore, Colorado had not specifically identified financially and physically feasible measures
which would improve the efficiency of existing water uses. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S.
310, 319 (1984).
88. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
89. Precisely what a state would do with its alloted water necessarily depends on the circumstances
in which the state finds itself as well as the aspirations it may have for the future. The point here
remains that the state ought to have clear and certain knowledge of its entitlement so that it can
proceed with its plans.
90. Stanfield, supra note 76.
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continuity of human life and the noninvidious re-creation of community.""
Unity and stability, as earlier discussions indicated, are the objectives
of an instituted process known as the human substantive economy. 2 To
avoid economic disruptions and to guarantee a "continuous supply of
want satisfying material means" 93 to the nation, the relationship among
the states must be harmonious. Equitable apportionment contributes positively to that relationship as it "assures each state of a fair share and
prevents any state, simply because it is upstream, bigger, more economically advanced, or more aggressive, from taking more than its share of
the river."" Unity in the context of equitable apportionment, therefore,
is derived from equity and justice between the states; stability, on the
other hand, is brought forth by power and freedom within a state.95 As
a practical matter, when a state's share of water is known, "that state
can plan, allocate, and use its water resources in a rational manner for
the future, as well as the present. "'
As the legal doctrine of the commerce clause should be replaced by
that of equitable apportionment, so must the form of integration in the
economy97 be changed. Reciprocity" as a form of economic integration
is the logical substitute for market exchange. "Aristotle taught that to
every kind of community (koin6nia) there corresponded a kind of goodwill (philia) amongst its members which expressed itself in reciprocity
(antipeponthos). . . . [It implies that] the closer the members of the encompassing community feel drawn to one another, the more general will
be the tendency among them to develop reciprocative attitudes in regard
to specific relationships."" Good-will undoubtedly flows more easily
from mutually supportive relationships between states which are perceived
as equitable and just than from those considered antagonistic and threatening.
Reciprocity requires an existing structure of symmetrically arranged
groupings to be functional," a requisite condition readily found among
equal quasi-sovereign states in a federal union. As a form of economic
integration, reciprocity can be attained via a variety of methods or patterns
of transaction. Sharing of burden according to established rules, taking
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

M. TOOL, supra note 20.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Polanyi, supra note 21.
Utton, supra note 9. at 987.
See supra note 25.
Utton, supra note 9, at 987.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Polanyi, supra note 21, at 250-56.

99. Id. at 253.
100. Id. at 250, 251, 252.
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of things in definite sequence, and exchange of benefit at set rates are
historical examples. ' Hence it is not difficult to discern the consistency
between the structure of economic behavior illustrated here and the policy
set forth by equitable apportionment discussed above."0 2
Established rules, a definite sequence, and set rates fit the characteristics
of a type of public policy called regulation by Theodore Lowi.0 3 Regulatory policies generally provide broad rules and guidelines. In the short
run, they involve a direct choice of who will be indulged and who deprived. " Equitable apportionment fits the regulatory model. In dividing
water resources shared by two states, equitable apportionment has the
authority to determine the overall allocation, at times resulting in indulgence for one and deprivation for the other. 05 Nevertheless, the degree
of specificity remains fairly low-not much beyond the quantity of water
in each share and the points of appropriation-so that states retain much
autonomy and flexibility in their planning and management.
While one or both states may not be fully satisfied with the apportionment decision, the system as a whole benefits from the element of
certainty inherent in the decisionmaking process and the final decision
itself. Both states can be sure that their rights have been properly considered; both states can be certain of their respective shares to which they
are entitled. Furthermore, some see even more important reasons for
erecting a structure of rules. "Without definite arrangements to ensure
survival and justice, there will be ruin; hence the clear-cut need for rules
and coercion with respect to our use of land, air, water, and other vital
resources. "106
Regulation involving rules and shares established outside the market
reflects society's dissatisfaction with the allocation obtained through market competition. It also represents society's attempt to limit the scope of
market allocation, partly in the interest of diversity and balance. "For
the same reasons that an investor holds many different stocks and bonds
in his portfolio, society diversifies its mechanisms for distribution and
allocation. It won't put all of its eggs in the market's basket.""0 7 It is in
this sense that equitable apportionment is a form of regulation. To fulfill
the objectives of promoting equity and justice, enhancing freedom and
power, as well as ensuring unity and stability within the federal union101. Id. at 253.

102. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
103. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16
PoLrrcs 677, 690-91 (1964).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
106. G. LODGE, supra note 60, at 281.
107. A. OKUN, supra note 50, at 13.
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objectives which already have been demonstrated earlier in this article to
be important-the locus of allocative decisionmaking ought to be moved
away from the market. Regulatory policy founded on the doctrine of
equitable apportionment, as the analysis above shows, is far more capable
of meeting those objectives.
CONCLUSION
Efficiency has been one of the primary arguments for instituting market
exchange for the allocation of interstate water resources. A policy striving
to enhance allocative efficiency, such as that embodied in the commerce
clause and exemplified by Sporhase and El Paso, generally refers to
improvement in social welfare as justification.
According to the most common definition by welfare economists, public welfare of society is said to have improved when a change in resource
allocation results in benefit gains by at least one person while inflicting
harm to nobody."° This conception of welfare improvement, however,
is flawed by mistaking the part for the whole. "Even if there are no
losers-if at least one person prefers and no one opposes the policy-it
is preferable just from that individual's point of view. The idea that it is
preferable from society's point of view either means nothing or begs the
entire question. Why should a policy that benefits some be considered,
in addition, to benefit society or to command the consent of society as a
whole?"" 0
Different states have to deal with their own unique circumstances.
Public policy affecting them must address the special needs of each state
separately if justice is to be served.' " Using the monetary yardstick in
policymaking as the common measure of costs and benefits in welfare
determination is to ignore this element of uniqueness. Because the market
considers each participant as essentially identical, the market approach
to interstate water resources allocation not only glosses over very important fundamental differences among the states, but it penalizes the
poor while advancing the rich in ruinous competition. The final outcome
whould not be a healthy federal union; on the contrary, equity, justice,
power, and freedom for some would be eroded in order to further the
economic prosperity of others. Ultimately, the cohesion of the community
could be jeopardized.
A common theme runs through all the arguments presented in this
108. This is the definition of Pareto improvement of social welfare. For more detail, see, for
example, D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 350 (1986).

109. Sagoff, supra note 12.
110. One criterion of justice is to distribute benefits according to special needs or requirements.
See Mooney, supra note 85, at 227.
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article: The market has its place in society, but society needs to keep the
market in its place. To permit the operation of the market in apparent
total disregard for the special needs and requirements of various states
in an area which arouses such intense anxiety as water, particularly in
the arid West, seems unwise. A regulatory policy based on equitable
apportionment might be better suited to achieve the objectives of equity,
freedom, and community cohesion as it treats the rights of each state on
an equal basis, specifies the share of interstate water each state is entitled
to, and thus enables each state to plan and manage its water resources to
fulfill its own aspirations. It is for these reasons that the alternative policy
approach is recommended.

